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CHOICE THEORY: A RESTATEMENT
Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller
ABSTRACT
This chapter restates choice theory, which advances a liberal approach to contract law. First, we
refine the concept of autonomy for contract. Then we address range, limit, and floor, three
principles that together justify contract law in a liberal society. The first concerns the state’s
obligation to be proactive in facilitating the availability of a multiplicity of contract types. The
second refers to the respect contract law owes to the autonomy of a party’s future self, that is, to
the ability to re‐write the story of one’s life. The final principle concerns relational justice, the
baseline for any legitimate use of the contract power. We conclude this restatement of choice
theory by highlighting its most important jurisprudential payoff–how our account relates to and
improves on the economic analysis of contract. Choice theory is the modest price that economic
analysis must pay to account for individual freedom.
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CHOICE THEORY: A RESTATEMENT
Hanoch Dagan* & Michael Heller**

I. INTRODUCTION
In The Choice Theory of Contracts,1 we advance a liberal approach to justify
contractual freedom. In this account, contract is best interpreted as essentially a
power‐conferring institution, with autonomy as its grounding principle, its telos.
Choice theory brings jurisprudential coherence to contract as a whole, explains
many otherwise puzzling doctrines, and offers a normatively attractive program
for law reform.
This chapter offers an up‐to‐date restatement of choice theory, which has
benefitted from rigorous scholarly scrutiny in the time since the Choice Theory book
first appeared.2 Restated, choice theory contends that three principles—addressing
range, limit, and floor—guide contract law in a liberal society:
(1) Range. The state is obligated proactively to facilitate the availability and
viability of multiple contract types in each sphere of human endeavor.
(2) Limit. Contract law must respect the autonomy of a party’s future self, that
is, it must take seriously the ability to re‐write the story of one’s life.

Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation & Director of the
Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Tel‐Aviv University.

*

Lawrence A. Wien Professor of Real Estate Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to
Benjamin Zipursky for his important comments.
**

1

See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACT (2017).

See in particular Volume 20 of THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (2019) (challenges from
leading contracts scholars), Volume 38 of LAW & PHILOSOPHY (2020) (liberal philosophy),
and Volume 20 of JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. (2019) (law and economics). Responding
to these challenges, we refine choice theory in three articles. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael
Heller, Freedom, Choice, and Contracts, 20 THEOR. INQ. L. 595 (2019) [hereinafter Dagan &
Heller, Freedom & Choice]; Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Autonomy for Contract, Refined,
38 L. & PHIL. * (2020); Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Why Autonomy Must Be Contract’s
Ultimate Value, 20 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 148 (2019).
2
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(3) Floor. To justify coercive enforcement by the state, all contracts must
comply with the demands of relational justice.
Our original account was structured primarily around range. As we showed
in Choice Theory, states largely comply with this injunction in the commercial
sphere; there, we highlighted the theory’s reformist agenda for the spheres of work,
home, and intimacy. Here, we read range, limit, and floor together, an approach that
grounds the core claim of choice theory more forcefully: contract’s ultimate value
must be autonomy, defined as the right of free and equal individuals to self‐
determination (or self‐authorship, a term we use interchangeably).
Choice theory contests the conventional wisdom that associates the liberal
commitment to freedom of contract with negative liberty or personal independence,
that is, with the idea that law should enforce whatever private deals individuals
agree to and otherwise get out of the way. 3 Self‐determination, rather than
independence, we argue, both grounds contractual liability and accounts for the
main features that typify modern contract law.
Choice theory is an interpretive theory of contract law in liberal societies. It
builds on existing practices and thus reaffirms much of existing law. But an
interpretive theory is not a descriptive exercise. Rather, it provides an account of
our legal practices that suggests a new perspective on the law. Although
interpretive legal theories are falsifiable, their falsifiability is typically not an easy
task. Thus, one could perhaps imagine a liberal society in which one (or more) of
the three principles of liberal contract—proactive facilitation, regard for the future
self, and relational justice—is missing. But choice theory, like other interpretive
legal theories, is not easily falsifiable, because interpretation implies reconstruction,
which necessarily involves marginalization and demarginalization of various
features of the system.
The fact that the theory’s falsifiability is not easy is, however, a virtue,
because it allows the theory to serve as a normative ideal. It’s the compass that
provides internal resources of critique for lawyers who are loyal to their duty to
push the law to comply better with its duties of justice. Choice theory indeed
See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59, 139 (2004). For an early incarnation of this
view, see Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 368–69, 373 (1921).
3
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suggests possible improvements in the law, and at times it even points to urgent
reforms needed to ensure law’s continued legitimacy. Finally, choice theory also
highlights new questions that offer a research agenda for future reformers and
scholars.
Part II refines the concept of autonomy we develop in Choice Theory and
explains why it should ground liberal contract law. Parts III, IV, and V address
range, limit, and floor, respectively. Part VI concludes by highlighting choice
theory’s most consequential jurisprudential payoff—how our account improves on
the economic analysis of contract. We show the hidden normative price of adhering
to welfare foundationalism, the approach that has dominated contract theory in
recent decades. Economic analysis can lead to justified reforms, but only if
integrated into a teleological scheme that takes autonomy, rather than welfare, as
its ultimate value. Choice theory is the (modest) price that economic analysis must
pay to account for individual freedom.

II. AUTONOMY AS CONTRACT’S TELOS
Negative rights alone cannot guarantee people’s autonomy. 4 In a liberal
polity, people are entitled to more, that is, to a system of law supportive of their
autonomy, rather than merely one that respects their capacity for uncoerced choice.
In turn, people’s right to self‐determination—to have some control over their
destiny—depends on both material conditions and a sufficiently heterogeneous
inventory of alternatives.5
States employ many means to carry out their obligation to facilitate people’s
self‐determination. Contract is just one such means, a power‐conferring state‐
provided institution. Like other means for self‐determination, the institution of
contract, if it is to be legitimate, must be situated within a robust background
regime that guarantees everyone the material, social, and intellectual preconditions
needed for self‐authorship. In other words, it is implausible to expect that contract
law’s legitimacy is freestanding. At the same time, contract’s autonomy‐enhancing

4

See H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 836 (1979).

5

See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372, 398 (1986).
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role is non‐optional and irreducible. A liberal state is obligated to provide contract
law.

A. Contract for Autonomy
To appreciate contract’s irreducible function, it is helpful to begin by
considering why contract is a convention that any polity committed to autonomy
must adopt.6 The answer is that the normative powers contract makes available are
essential to people’s ability to plan over time.
1. Time, Plans, and Expectations. And why does the ability to plan matter for
self‐determination? As one observer notes, “self‐determination consists in the
carrying out of higher‐order projects,” each of which is “composed of a set of plans
arranged in a temporal sequence.” This means that a successful exercise of self‐
determination is “an intertemporal achievement,” which thus typically requires “a
temporal horizon of action.”7
Contract law’s signature role is that it vindicates promisees’ expectations, a
core condition of autonomy. How? By ensuring the reliability of contractual
promises for future performance, and not merely the protection of promisees’ actual
reliance, contract law enables people to extend their ability to plan into the future.
Contract is the means through which we can legitimately enlist others to
our own goals, purposes, and projects—both material and social. This
intertemporal dimension is prominent in relational contracts, but is no less
important in one‐shot contracts. In both cases, the predictability that expectations
will be fulfilled is key for allowing people to plan and thus to act on their capacity
“to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good.”8
Choice theory is so named because the core of contract’s autonomy‐
enhancing function is to expand the range of choices people can make to be the
authors of their own lives over time. Contract law, enforced through state coercion,
See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117
PHIL. REV. 481, 520 (2008).
6

7

Charles R. Beitz, Property and Time, 26 J. POL. PHIL. 419, 427 (2018).

8

JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 19 (2001).
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expands the available repertoire of secure interpersonal engagements beyond the
realm of gift‐based and similarly close‐knit interactions.
2. Instrumental and Constitutive Choices. While all additional choices are
potentially valuable, an autonomy‐enhancing account must distinguish choices
based on how they actually contribute to self‐determination. As an initial matter,
we note that some contracts facilitate instrumental choices, while others address
constitutive ones.
Some choices contract affords are instrumentally important: they satisfy
preferences which reflect and serve people’s life‐plans. Or they may contribute to
people’s general welfare which in turn serves as a means for advancing their self‐
determination. This category of choice naturally lends itself to the familiar cost
benefit analysis that renders commensurate all contract rules and terms.
But other choices go beyond preference satisfaction: they relate to people’s
“ground projects”—the projects that make us who we are and give meaning to our
lives.9 This is a significant category because it reminds us that contract is not only
important for commerce, but also is potentially empowering in the other spheres
that Choice Theory highlights: home, work, and intimacy. And, unlike instrumental
choices, constitutive ones are not easily analyzed in cost benefit terms.

B. Justifying Enforcement
As we just noted, for contract to enhance autonomy, contractual promises
must be reliable. In turn, reliability depends on a background rule: people who
invoke the contract convention must be deemed to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of contract law, which goes, as noted, beyond the harm principle. This
is a demanding rule that applies even to promisors who have not deliberately
intended to be so bound. How can it be defended in a liberal regime that enforces
only people’s duties of right while it avoids forcing people to be virtuous?

See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1419
(2016).

9
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1. Independence and Self‐Determination. This question reformulates contract’s
long‐standing justificatory challenge, most powerfully posed by Lon Fuller and
William Perdue:10 Why does contract law go beyond promisors’ reliance interest,
vindicating their expectation interest? Why is it willing to coercively enforce
promises even when nonperformance generates no detrimental harm?
In Choice Theory, we showed why earlier attempts to face this challenge
predictably failed. These accounts assumed that contractual duties—like other
interpersonal duties in private law—must be founded on people’s reciprocal
respect for independence. But if our interpersonal obligations are indeed exhausted
by reciprocal respect for each other’s independence, then the enforcement of
wholly‐executory contracts cannot plausibly be justified. Why? Because contract’s
background rule, which goes, as noted, beyond the harm principle, implies that
promisors owe some affirmative duties to intended promisees.
This difficulty dissolves, however, as soon as we recognize that, in a liberal
polity, people are justifiably expected to pay some modest price to benefit others.
This price is entailed by our duty to respect each other’s right of self‐determination
in our interpersonal relationships. The facts of interdependence and personal
difference—and thus the vulnerability and the valuable options to which these
social conditions give rise—require that the liberal commitment to individual self‐
determination cannot be excluded from the law governing relationships between
people.11 It should be no surprise, therefore, that modest affirmative interpersonal
duties do indeed typify private law.12
2. Modest Affirmative Duties. The key here is modest duties. Private law
resists, as it should, excessive interference with people’s autonomy that many
affirmative interpersonal duties to aid others entail. For example, duties of
friendship and of benevolence are rightly beyond law’s reach. But private law is

See L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52 (1936).
10

See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework,
37 L. & PHIL. 171 (2018).
11

See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy and Property (in this volume); Avihay Dorfman, Relational
Justice and Torts (in this volume).

12
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not, need not, and should not be a stronghold of interpersonal independence, with
a blanket rejection of affirmative duties. That view results from a particular Kantian
understanding of the distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue.
Liberalism need not, and should not, prescribe that duties of right are only duties
of abstention.
A liberal state should be concerned with excessive interpersonal
impositions, but that worry does not imply a blanket rejection of affirmative duties
in private law. As H.L.A. Hart argued, not every infringement of independence
ignores “the moral importance of the division of humanity into separate
individuals and threatens the proper inviolability of persons.” We agree here with
Hart and accept the significance of distinguishing “between the gravity of the
different restrictions on different specific liberties and their importance for the
conduct of a meaningful life.”13
Indeed, private law’s grundnorm of reciprocal respect for self‐
determination—governing interpersonal relationships in a liberal polity—implies
that there is no way, and no reason, to bypass the modest interpersonal burden that
law imposes on promisors who voluntarily invoke the contract convention while
engaging with promisees. Because contract’s empowerment potential depends on
people’s ability to count on the representations of others, an autonomy‐enhancing
view of contract implies that individuals may be required to satisfy promisees’
expectations even if they only inadvertently invoked the convention of contract
with no subjective intention to be legally obligated and even before promisees have
actually been harmed. The burden such a regime imposes on promisors—the
precautions it requires—is the modest price each party pays so the other can benefit
from contract law’s potential to advance our self‐determination.
This lesson animates the principles that guide liberal contract law—range,
limit, and floor. But before delving into these principles, we respond to two
challenges. First, we show that celebrating autonomy as contract’s telos does not
offend liberal neutrality. Second, we argue that placing autonomy as contract’s
ultimate value does not conflict with contract’s other instrumental and intrinsic
values.

13

Hart, supra note 4, at 834–35.
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C. On Neutrality and Pluralism
1. Neutrality. Not everyone is committed to the foundational status of
individual self‐determination. Religious believers, at least some, reject self‐
determination. They may view morality not as the affirmation of the self, but rather
in its forgetfulness. Many religious believers may happily endorse contract’s
service to commerce, and, at the same time, may be offended if choice theory’s more
ambitious autonomy‐enhancing approach were embraced. This concern, if valid,
suggests that choice theory violates liberal toleration. Fortunately, it does not.
Even if religious believers indeed find the ideal of self‐determination
offensive, 14 this objection would be indefensible. Remember that contract is a
power‐conferring device, which people can, but need not, use in the service of their
self‐determination. Bolstering the autonomy‐enhancing capacity of contract in the
fields of work, home, and intimacy would empower people. But it would not force
them to deviate from their already existing (more circumscribed) ways of
conducting themselves in these spheres.
While adding choice among contract types may be controversial, objectors
cannot rely on a claim grounded in liberal neutrality among conceptions of the
good. Quite the contrary. This objection to choice is, after all, an argument against
allowing others—not the objectors themselves—to benefit fully from contract’s
empowering potential. Religious believers can continue as before to practice in
accord with their beliefs. Rejecting choice theory requires law to comply with the
objectors’ “external preferences,” that is, with their views regarding the proper
“assignment of goods and opportunities to others.” But as Ronald Dworkin argued,
taking this type of preference seriously violates, rather than vindicates, “the right of
everyone to be treated with equal concern and respect.”15

As the text implies, for us, self‐determination still seems indispensable: even if people
should not author their life story, they need to at least discover it. See Leslie Green, What is
Freedom For?, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 77/201 (2012),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193674.
14

15

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 275 (1977).
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2. Pluralism. To further ease neutralist worries of unequal treatment of
different conceptions of the good, it may be helpful to clarify the subtle, but
important, distinction in the meaning of autonomy in choice theory and in certain
versions of perfectionist liberalism.
Self‐determination, for us, is contract’s ultimate value. It is not a means for
securing a rich and satisfying life in terms of human perfections and excellences.
As such, autonomy is not implicated in any form of (potentially disrespectful)
paternalism. For choice theory, an autonomy‐based contract law is committed to
empowering individuals in forming and pursuing their own conception of life so
long as they do not denigrate others’.
This is exactly why choice theory requires law to offer, for each sphere of
human interaction, a sufficiently diverse range of contract types. Choice theory
prescribes that these types must be partial functional substitutes, so that law’s
inventory offers people real alternatives from which they can choose. Additionally,
one of the ways meaningful choice can be enhanced is by enriching this repertoire
through support for minoritarian or utopian contract types. This requirement
implies that law must not invest in contract types based solely on demand. At the
same time, this demand‐insensitivity of choice theory involves neither censorship
nor worth‐ranking.
Choice theory’s pluralism, however, is not foundational. This point is
crucial. Foundational value pluralism is normatively unacceptable because it may
end up undermining the right of each person to equal concern and respect. It also
fails to impose order on pre‐theoretical practices and thus fails to provide contract
law either guidance or constraint. Choice theory, by contrast, is not pluralist all the
way up; it does not perceive autonomy as merely one value among many.
Autonomy is contract’s ultimate value. Below autonomy, and cabined at
the intermediate level of contract types, choice theory is functionally pluralist
regarding the goods of contracts—roughly rendered as utility and community.
Why? Because a range of contract types serving plural values gives people real
choices, and that is most conducive to the ultimate goal of enhancing autonomy.
To restate, choice theory is adamantly committed to the parties’ autonomy.
There is no pluralism regarding this ultimate value and its robust consequences for
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law’s justification and design. At the same time, choice theory is insistently agnostic
regarding the various combinations of “dosages” of community and utility that a
society chooses in its contract types—so long as there are enough partial functional
substitutes (to ensure choice and enhance autonomy), and so long as they all
comply with the future‐self limit and the relational‐justice floor (for reasons we
clarify below).
The combination of foundational autonomy with pluralist contract types is an
important jurisprudential feature of choice theory. This architecture generates
important guidelines that constrain the design of contract law, and thus offers
reasonably‐specific, contract‐based criteria for evaluating the law. These
guidelines, to which we now turn, flow from choice theory’s distinctive
commitment to contract’s autonomy‐enhancing telos and from its claim that private
law’s foundational maxim of reciprocal respect for self‐determination grounds the
legitimacy of contract law.

III. PROACTIVE FACILITATION
The three guiding principles of liberal contract law—proactive facilitation,
regard for future self, and relational justice—justify and explain a surprisingly
broad set of contract rules, from inception to breakdown. These principles regulate
the bargaining process and formation of contracts; determine the parties’
obligations by identifying and interpreting their agreement, fill gaps and set norms
for performance and excuse; and finally define the consequences of breach by
prescribing the type and scope of available remedies. We begin with the first
principle: the state’s obligation proactively to facilitate contract types.

A. The Role of Law
To serve its autonomy‐enhancing telos properly, contract requires proactive
legal facilitation. The contract convention cannot leave people entirely to their own
devices, as required by the laissez faire notion of “freedom of contract.” Contract
types must be prevalent and robust. Prevalence is the precondition for people’s
ability to cross the lines from their rather limited preexisting communities.
Robustness helps people overcome the various transaction costs that otherwise
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impede voluntary transactions, while it also ensures that contract law can do its
essential cultural work.
1. Contract as Language. As it becomes more prevalent and robust, an
autonomy‐enhancing law must avoid the illiberal paternalism implied by active
preference‐shaping. And yet contract must do more than mere enforcement of
privately‐dickered deals—if it is to empower people to be authors of their lives.
In his review of our book, Charles Fried nicely captures the subtle cultural
role choice theory ascribes to contract types. Contract types, he writes, offer parties
“a menu of possible interactions” that are crucial for “party autonomy and self‐
fulfillment . . . because human interactions and legal interventions are hardly
imaginable without them.” Just like “language that enables thought[,] without
types, our minds would be blank.”16
Taking this function of law seriously implies that old‐fashioned “freedom
of contract,” though significant, cannot possibly replace active legal facilitation.
Lack of legal support is often tantamount to undermining—maybe even
obliterating—a wide “menu” of cooperative types of interpersonal relationships.
People seeking their own conception of the good need a “language” of viable
choices, not a blank slate on which to write. This is why contract’s autonomy‐
enhancing promise requires a robust legal edifice.
2. The Risk of Involuntariness. But contract law’s proactive obligations are
not risk‐free from the standpoint of autonomy. As contract law becomes more
elaborate, the risk increases that it will apply to obligations that are not fully
voluntary. Ensuring the promisor’s full voluntariness—not only regarding the
interaction with the promisee, but also with respect to its legal consequences—is a
challenge that an autonomy‐enhancing contract law must take seriously. Why?
Because involuntariness infringes the promisor’s independence, which is
intrinsically valuable (even if not of ultimate value).
To some extent, this risk can be reduced by making the conventions of
contract explicit and thus more socially transparent. But an autonomy‐enhancing

16

Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: Lessons Learned, 20 THEOR. INQ. L. 367, 377–78 (2019).
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contract law cannot be contented solely with this partial safeguard against the risk
of involuntariness. Two sets of contract doctrines respond to this risk.
a. Duress and Misrepresentation. The first is straightforward: core rules of
contract formation—notably duress and misrepresentation—exclude from
enforcement promises that are the product of the promisee’s manipulation of the
promisor’s free will.
b. Writing Requirement and Other Formalities. The second set of doctrines
deals with contract law’s “entry rules” and was highlighted by Lon Fuller’s account
of the functions performed by legal formalities. As Fuller noted, the significance of
form in law goes beyond its evidentiary function. Formalities, such as the
requirement of writing, also perform cautionary (or deterrent) functions by offering
“channels for the legally effective expression of intention” and by “acting as a check
against inconsiderate action.”17

B. Facilitative Contract Doctrines
1. Objective Theory. The objective theory of contract is a good example of the
principle of proactive facilitation. While many theories of contract converge in
support of the objective approach, choice theory provides a particularly secure
justification for its role in modern contract law. The contemporary status of the
objective theory is best explained by the qualitative difference between its
impressive autonomy‐enhancing potential and the much more limited potential of
any subjective theory of contract.
This explanation also re‐frames and clarifies some of the most contentious
issues of contract doctrine dealing with the parol evidence rule and with contract
interpretation. The autonomy perspective highlights the empowering potential of
the predictability generated by delimiting the range of admissible evidence and by
focusing on the literal meaning of the parties’ agreement.
2. Incomplete Contracts and Gap‐Filling. Taking seriously contract’s
autonomy‐enhancing telos not only justifies the widespread endorsement of the
objective theory, but also justifies and explains further doctrinal features of contract
17

Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (1941).
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law. First, consider incomplete agreements. While traditional common law judges
hesitated to enforce incomplete agreements, modern law takes a diametrically‐
opposed attitude.

18

Contemporary contract law is no longer satisfied with

providing enforcement services only to parties who fully specify the terms of their
engagement. Certainly, where the parties “intentionally and deliberately” do not
“incorporate in their agreements readily available, verifiable measures of
performance,” courts correctly infer that they do not intend legal enforcement.19
But beyond this limited category, current law—both the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts20—goes out of its way to facilitate
transactions by offering defaults that can fill gaps, even regarding crucial aspects
of a transaction, such as price.21 A significant subset of the modern contract law
canon belongs to this category.
Liberal contract theories that adhere to an independence‐based view of
private law face severe difficulties in accounting for this robust apparatus. Randy
Barnett, for example, argues that law’s default rules do not defy his consent theory
so long as these defaults mirror “the commonsense expectations of persons in the
relevant community of discourse,” because there are good reasons to assume that
“such terms can be and often are indirectly consented to by parties who could have
contracted around them—but did not.”22 This account, however, cannot explain the
breadth and depth of contract law’s gap‐filling apparatus.
If contract rules were indeed guided by principles of independence—that
is, if the paramount concern were safeguarding interpersonal boundaries by
ensuring party consent—then the law would have adhered to the traditional
common law approach, rather than adopted the one that typifies contemporary
18

See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 120–21 (4th ed., 2004).

Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self‐Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
1657, 1659 (2003).

19

See U.C.C. § 2‐204(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
20

21

See U.C.C. § 2‐305.

Randy E. Barnett, The Sounds of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L.
REV. 821, 821, 826, 875, 906 (1986).
22
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law. The old, rejected approach induced parties to spell out the main terms of their
interaction and thus reduced the divergence between their actual intent and the
rules that governed their agreements.
By contrast, current law’s capacious gap‐filling apparatus directly follows
from and supports choice theory’s prescription. It expands the scope of people’s
voluntary obligations to empower their self‐determination. 23 Like the objective
theory, this robust apparatus is not risk‐free. As noted, facilitating people’s
autonomy through contract requires law to refine its “anti‐involuntariness” tools.
It also leaves some precautionary burden on parties, which is yet another aspect of
liberal contract law’s dependence on modest affirmative interpersonal duties in line
with its reliance on private law’s grundnorm of reciprocal respect for self‐
determination.24
3. Doctrinal Variation Among Types. When gap‐filling emerges as a core
function of modern contract law, many other doctrines must adapt as well. In
particular, for gap‐filling to do its autonomy‐enhancing job, there must be
significant variation in how a single doctrine applies across contract types.
To put the point more sharply, the rise of gap‐filling—expanding the
facilitative ambition of contract—poses a fundamental challenge to trans‐
substantive contract theories. It requires law to adjust the means through which it
identifies mutually‐beneficial interactions worthy of support and the rules that best
enable them. Accordingly, modern contract law does not hesitate to “deviate” from
what conventional theory posits as “core” doctrines. But this is not deviation. In
embracing variation in doctrine among contract types, law is responding precisely
how choice theory requires.
This devotion to contract’s autonomy‐enhancement telos explains and
justifies the development of promissory estoppel and of the material benefit rule as
additional gatekeeping doctrines, alongside traditional consideration doctrine. It
likewise accounts for the gradual recognition that the mirror‐image rule for offer

See Hanoch Dagan, Types of Contracts and Law’s Autonomy‐Enhancing Role, 5 EUR. CONT.
L. & THEORY (forthcoming 2020).
23

Note, however, that even independence theories cannot escape the risk of
involuntariness as long as they subscribe (as they do) to the objective theory.
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and acceptance, the standard of performance of perfect tender, and the promisor’s
strict liability—rules often presented as part of contract law’s signature core—are
not universal, and indeed do not apply in certain contract types.

C. Intra‐Sphere Multiplicity
The last feature in law’s toolkit of proactively facilitating contracts is the
one we emphasized most in Choice Theory: the state’s obligation to ensure sufficient
contract types and secure intra‐sphere multiplicity. A liberal contract law should
support choice within each familiar category of human activity, so that law
provides enough, and sufficiently distinctive, contract types within each sphere.
More, not fewer, contract types are necessary to make individual choice genuine.
More types are also necessary to dilute state coercion.
1. More Law, Less Coercion. Law always implicates power. But choice
theory’s multiplicity prescription tends to curb law’s coercive effects vis‐à‐vis its
monistic counterpart (one type per sphere). Admittedly, at pathological moments
of contract, when litigation follows breakup, pluralist and monist regimes may
assign decision‐makers the same coercive power. But the endgame drama of
contract breakup should not obscure the significance of the ex ante choices available
to people when they enter, and then shape, their interpersonal relationships. From
this perspective, a pluralist approach to contract types opens up options for
autonomy‐enhancing choice—rather than channeling everyone to a single type
privileged by law.
When contract law complies with choice theory prescription of intra‐sphere
multiplicity, then individuals are freer to navigate their own course, bypassing
certain legal prescriptions and avoiding their implications—thereby reducing the
coercive power of those who issued them. Moreover, choice theory directs the
architects of contract law to take a more embracing stance toward contract types
emerging from minority views and utopian theories (such as “nonconjugal aspiring
families” in the sphere of intimacy, or “shared equity” homeownership in the
sphere of home). Multiplicity thus facilitates people’s ability to opt out of the
choices of the majority, reducing law’s normalizing effects.
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Contract law has already taken substantial steps towards meeting its
obligation for intra‐sphere multiplicity, particularly in the commercial sphere.
Think, for example, of contract‐type innovations—exclusive dealings, outputs, and
requirement contracts – that are now part of the contract canon.25 But outside the
commercial sphere, with its many examples, law’s repertoire of contract types is
quite limited. The reformist work of choice theory’s multiplicity maxim is thus most
urgent in the spheres of work, home, and intimacy.
2. Mechanics of Choice. Implementing this prescription is not a
straightforward matter, for at least three reasons. 26 The first implementation
challenge concerns autonomy‐reducing choice. Although multiplicity of types is
conducive to autonomy all else equal, all else is not always equal. Indeed, at times,
increasing choice may reduce autonomy. This means that an unqualified call for
multiplicity should be rejected. Multiplicity must be limited if cognitive,
behavioral, structural, or political economy analyses suggest that it would, in
practice, be autonomy‐reducing. While intra‐sphere multiplicity is an important
means, it is not the only means to the enhancing autonomy. This concern requires
refining choice theory’s broad multiplicity injunction, but it does not overwhelm
its normative significance.
The second implementation challenge for multiplicity concerns the problem
of legal forms. Contract types, as we understand them, are legal forms, and are thus
subject to the familiar difficulties of resorting to forms. To secure the empowering
potential of multiplicity and minimize the risk of involuntariness, law needs to
stabilize a set of contract types, each with its own animating principle—its balance
of utility and community, to use our terms. This means that contract types must be
well‐defined and properly advertised, and that courts must be cautious when
analogizing rules from one type to another. It also requires lawmakers to prescribe
tailored criteria for entry to each type and to ensure that rules are suited to people’s

25

See U.C.C. § 2‐306.

A fourth important reason relates to the institutional allocation of labor. See DAGAN &
HELLER, supra note 2, at 130–34; Dagan & Heller, Freedom & Choice, supra note 4, at 615–19.
26
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choice capacities. 27 None of this is easy for imperfect courts and legislatures to
accomplish, but neither does it excuse the obligation to try.
Third, and finally, implementing choice theory requires determining what
constitutes an “adequate range of options” within any given contracting sphere. What
is the right number of types and what should be the degree of variance among
them? This is admittedly a complex task, one that must respond to an uncertain
empirical environment. But difficulty does not excuse the obligation because the
core guideline is normative. For contract types to be autonomy‐enhancing, they
must be, as noted, partial functional substitutes for each other. On the one hand,
types must be substitutes because alternatives that are orthogonal to each other do
not enhance choice (insurance does not substitute for franchise, and neither
substitutes for marriage). On the other hand, substitutability cannot be too
complete because overly‐similar types also do not offer meaningful choice.
3. The Urgency of Multiplicity. Though challenging to implement, the
obligation of intra‐sphere multiplicity is normatively significant, indeed, urgent. A
telling example comes from the sphere of work. Today, law offers people a binary
choice between employee and independent contractor status. This century‐old
limitation on contract types for work no longer tracks the diversity of work
relations that people seek.
Emerging workplace practices may also suggest room for additional
employment types. For example, law could be instrumental in facilitating new job‐
sharing arrangements. Or law can ratify contract types from cases in which
individuals are creating specifically designated worker co‐ops.28 More generally,
choice theory suggests moving beyond the current approach to employment

See Gregory Klass, Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice, 20 THEOR. INQ. L. 457
(2019); Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277 (2019).
27

Other new forms of work, notably in the platform economy, raise more complicated
challenges. They require law to adapt the means by which it secures relational justice
(think, for example, about occupational health and safety, anti‐discrimination, or fair pay
and working time regulations). See OECD, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2019: THE FUTURE
OF WORK ch. 4 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/9ee00155‐en. Though these adjustments are far
from trivial, if they can be put in place, then additional forms may open up new
opportunities, most notably in emerging economies. See id. at 56.
28
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contracts in which lawmakers choose between “at will” and “for cause” regimes as
the state‐level default. Why not make both choices available at the time of
employment? If employers must transparently choose among regimes, perhaps
employees would be more likely to know the rules governing their work contract.

IV. FUTURE SELF
Choice theory’s second principle—regard for the party’s future self—
becomes ever more significant as contract types multiply. But the normative basis
of our concern for future selves does not derive from multiplicity. Instead, it is
grounded directly on contract’s autonomy‐enhancing telos. Law that offers people
the normative power to commit themselves through contracts cannot ignore the
impact of such contracts on their future selves. The reason for this is that self‐
authorship requires a right to both write and re‐write the story of our lives, to be
able to start afresh.29
As Michael Bratman explains, people are planning agents, which implies
“diachronic rationality constraints.” And that, in turn, means people’s “prior
intentions provide a rational default for present deliberation.” 30 Liberal contract
law follows suit. It offers people the normative power to make contractual
commitments, and properly assumes that insofar that these commitments are
indeed part of the current self’s plan, the future self is presumed to adhere to them.
But self‐determination also requires that people have the right to re‐write
the story of their lives. New “ordinary desires and preferences” may not suffice.
Nonetheless, planning agency implies only “defeasible constancy: constancy in the
absence of supposed conclusive reason for an alternative.” In other words, the

The significance of the ability to start afresh may be what ultimately grounds the moral
significance of agents’ independence from theirs, and others’, standpoints. Cf. PETER
BENSON, JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS: A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 370 (2019).
29

See Michael E. Bratman, Time, Rationality, And Self‐Governance, 22 PHIL. ISSUES 73, 74
(2012).
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inter‐temporal constancy required by planning agency must be “sensitive to the
fact that sometimes an agent supposes there are conclusive reasons for change.”31
Free individuals make plans and undertake commitments, but they do not
always enact the role they set themselves in the script they once authored.
Autonomous life is neither a set of unrelated episodes nor a script fully written in
advance. Rather, autonomous people characteristically make decisions in a
piecemeal fashion, choosing both long‐term and short‐term pursuits. Self‐
determination allows—to some extent even requires—opportunities for people to
alter their plans and even, sometimes, to replace them completely.32

A. The Present and Future Challenge
On the one side, contract must attend to the both parties’ capacities as
promisees because that empowers self‐determination of their current selves—taking
seriously their right to write their life stories. To respect their role as promisees,
contract must ensure both parties—pace the Fuller/Perdue claim—a right to expect,
rather than to merely rely, on the others’ performance. At the same time, and, on
the flip side, contract must respect the parties’ self‐determination in their capacities
as promisors. This means that it should safeguard the self‐determination of their
future selves—thus vindicating their right to rewrite their life stories. The challenge
is to limit the range, and at times the types, of enforceable commitments people can
undertake consistent with the state’s obligation to respect both our present and
future selves.
Indeed, a robust autonomy‐based theory of contract must appreciate not
only the significance of enabling people to make credible commitments, but also
the impediment these commitments pose to their ability to rewrite their life‐story.
Contract theory must be alert to potential harmful implications of its operations for
the autonomy of promisors’ future selves. This seemingly simple statement
encapsulates one of the most difficult challenges to an autonomy‐enhancing

31

Id. at 82.

See JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 149, 151 (2008); Raz, supra note 5, at 384; Leslie
Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165, 171, 176 (1998).
32
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contract law. Since any act of self‐authorship constrains the future self, the state’s
obligation to enhance autonomy implies that contract law must both bolster and
limit people’s ability to commit.
This is a subtle task, and there is no easy formula for resolving this
difficulty. But resolution need not—and in an autonomy‐based contract law must
not—be done on an ad hoc basis. Ad hocery surely undermines autonomy. Instead,
liberal contract law must resort to “Hartian strategies” that apply qualitative
judgments. This familiar approach tries to find the system that is as conducive as
practicable to enhancing people’s autonomy, that is, it seeks a contract law that
generates the most autonomy‐friendly implications. The usual strategy—and the
correct one from the standpoint of the rule of law—is to identify categories of
limitations on parties’ exit—that is, on promisors’ freedom to change their minds—
that should not be enforceable because they undermine party autonomy too much.

B. Outer Limits of the Power to Commit
The power to revise or even discard one’s plans is an entailment of, not a
threat to, the normative underpinnings of contract. In turn, this entailment provides
a strong, principled justification for many otherwise‐puzzling contract doctrines.
1. Non‐Competes and Advance Sales. Consider, for example, restrictions on the
enforceability of employee non‐compete agreements, limits on the advance sale of
future wages, and the semi‐inalienability of the unilateral right to terminate long‐
term contracts (such as agency contracts). In many of these cases, the parties’ initial
intention to commit is unequivocal. A particularly interesting subset of this
category involves cases that are not interpersonally abusive.
Even in cases where the current self commits to a plan that is genuinely
empowering—the employee earns more and gains upgraded skills that open new
professional horizons—liberal contract law must acknowledge the possibility of
revision, which these doctrines, in practice, enshrine. Where the quid pro quo is a
significant encumbrance of the future self, even genuinely empowering agreements
may be subject to critical scrutiny: liberal contract cannot remain agnostic toward
severe limitations on the ability of an employee’s future self to rewrite the story of
her life.
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True, one can advance familiar efficiency‐based reasons for these
limitations, such as responses to rationality deficiencies, externalities, or other
market failures. But these reasons are tentative and contingent, subject to
elimination by emergent technologies or legal techniques that ameliorate
rationality deficiencies or overcome pertinent market failures. On the other hand,
the autonomy‐based rationale for these doctrines is different in nature,
independent of momentary technological and legal structures. Respect for the
ability to change one’s mind is an inherent entailment of contract’s most
fundamental commitment to people’s right to (re)invent themselves.
2. Damages and Specific Performance. Choice theory’s concern for our future
selves also helps explain the traditional common law’s strong preference for
monetary recovery. This preference is not, as often mistakenly asserted, an
embarrassment for contract law. 33 Instead, it is a salutary testament to contract
law’s fidelity to its underlying liberal commitments.
In the common law tradition, specific performance will not be ordered “if
damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured
party.”34 Other things equal (or close to equal) for the promisee, liberal contract law
rightly opts for this remedial approach. It does not compel the promisor to act in
accord with the contractual script, instead allowing the choice between doing so
and covering the promisee’s expectation.
This principled position accounts for the rigidity of existing law in resisting
awards of specific performance against service providers. 35 This is a deeply
entrenched rule, one that also applies in civil law jurisdictions where specific
performance is otherwise widely available.36 Even those jurisdictions take the value

See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708
(2007).
33

34

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1).

35

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, at § 367(1).

See, e.g., Charles Szladits, The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 AM. J. COMP.
L. 208, 226 (1955).
36
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of being able to switch plans seriously when it comes to awarding specific
performance against service providers.
When the stakes may concern the promisor’s “ground projects,” rather than
merely fungible resources, there is no difference between the common law and the
civil law. Both rigidly resist specifically forcing a person to work. And choice theory
explains why this entrenched and widespread rule is not an external imposition on
the logic of contract. Instead, the rule follows contract’s internal logic of self‐
authorship, one that proscribes such excessive impositions on the future self.37
By focusing on the parties’ self‐determination, choice theory also explains
why remedies differ when contract types implicate people’s self‐identity from
when they only raise material concerns. Thus, the law’s sensitivity to the difference
between “me” and “mine” justifies why there is no reasonableness inquiry
regarding refusals to accept a different or inferior position in mitigation of breach
of a personal service contract.38
3. Normative Defaults. Finally, law’s regard for the parties’ future selves need
not always result in a categorical limit on their ability to use the contract
convention. At times, this regard takes the form of normative defaults. These are rules
the parties are free to adjust or even reject, but whose status need not depend on
their responsiveness to majoritarian preferences. Normative defaults are chosen for
their freestanding value, and the contracting parties can overrule them only if they
use “apt and certain words.”39
For example, rules dealing with mutual mistake and with impossibility,
impracticability, and frustration can be understood as normative defaults. These
doctrines delimit the parties’ obligations by reference to their shared basic
assumptions with regard to facts, or to the occurrence of a future contingency,

For an account explaining why the common law’s justified preference for damages
should be treated as a normative default (except when workers are in breach), see Hanoch
Dagan
&
Michael
Heller,
Specific
Performance,
available
at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336.

37

38

See Parker v. Twentieth Century‐Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689, 692–94 (Cal. 1970).

39

Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
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material to their agreement.40 Risks that fall outside the domain of the shared plan
of the parties’ current selves, and are not allocated to the adversely‐affected party,
should not encumber their future self. Applying this rule is difficult, and its details
vary

across

contract

types,

but

its

autonomy‐enhancing

rationale

is

straightforward: there is no “autonomy gain” in enforcing contracts that go beyond
the parties’ own basic assumptions.41

V. RELATIONAL JUSTICE
The third and final guiding principle of choice theory arises from the
foundational right of reciprocal respect for self‐determination, the same right that
underlies the legitimacy of contract in the first instance. This right implies that,
when one invokes the contract convention, that party is also necessarily
undertaking the obligation to respect the other party’s self‐determination. As usual,
this obligation of respect cannot be too onerous, but neither is it limited to a
negative duty of non‐interference.

A. The Challenge of the Floor
Restated, if reciprocal respect for self‐determination is the premise for
contract’s own legitimacy, then relational justice must be ingrained in contract’s
normative DNA. But relational justice is not self‐defining. Part of the task for liberal
contract law is to set a “floor” for agreements. Below that floor, parties cannot
legitimately recruit the state’s coercive powers because enforcement would lead to
gross relational injustice. Attempts to enlist the law in the service of contracts that
defy relational justice must be treated (at least prima facie) as ultra vires. They abuse
the idea of contract, that is, they try to use law for a purpose that contravenes its
telos.
1. Internal and External Preconditions. Contract’s relational‐justice floor, just
like its concern for the future‐self limit, are preconditions for the legitimate use of
40

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152–52 (1981); U.C.C. § 2‐615.

See Hanoch Dagan & Ohad Somech, When Contract’s Basic Assumptions Fail: From Rose
2d to COVID‐19, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3605411.

41
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contract. But these are not the only preconditions, and not even the most familiar
ones. For example, contract law’s doctrine of public policy and related doctrines
(including antitrust law) target categories of agreements that produce substantial
systemic external effects on third parties. Contract’s future‐self limit and its
relational justice floor, however, are importantly different. They do not rely on any
consideration external to contract; rather, these constraints on contractual choice
follow the very same rationale that justifies enforcing contracts in the first place,
that is, they are internal to contract.42
This external/internal distinction is not only conceptually significant, but
also has prescriptive implications because the two categories “invite” different
normative analyses. In a liberal polity, policing contract’s externalities must be
performed with care because every contract has external effects, so achieving
perfect internalization risks the outright elimination of private ordering. By
contrast, the challenge regarding internal preconditions is different: a liberal polity
must be vigilant in ensuring that contracts do not undermine their own autonomy‐
enhancing telos.
2. Guidelines for Finding the Floor. Determining contract’s relational‐justice
floor, as with the future‐self limit, requires lawmakers to apply Hartian qualitative
judgments. The task is to ensure that the floor does not impede people’s
independence too much so that it undermines, rather than serves, self‐
determination. We offer no magic formula, but, with Hart, think this challenge
gives no reason for alarm. In co‐authored work with Avihay Dorfman, Dagan pins
down three guidelines, derived from the liberal ideal of reciprocal respect for self‐
determination, from the nature of legal prescriptions, and from rule‐of‐law
concerns, that translate Hart’s dictum into contract law:43

This means that these constraints, just like the external ones, do not involve any form of
paternalism. A more serious concern is that having a uniform floor might entail
normalizing effects. One possible way to address this concern is to prescribe multiple floors,
in line with choice theory’s commitment to multiplicity. See Hanoch Dagan, The Value of
Choice and the Justice of Contract, JURIS. 422, 431–33 (2019).

42

43

See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 9, at 1421–24.
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(a) The burden of the duty of reciprocal respect of self‐determination cannot be
excessive. It must neither undermine the autonomy of the involved parties
nor create too much interpersonal subordination between them.
(b) Certain practices (such as love or friendship) are rightfully shielded from
legal treatment. Legal enforcement might destroy their inherent moral
value or legal intervention might backfire by crowding out internal
motivations.
(c) Law’s rules should be relatively categorical. This helps guide law’s
addressees and constrains officials’ ability to exercise power by minimizing
resort to individualized knowledge and radically ad hoc judgments.
A wide array of contract rules tracks these “admission criteria” as they
implement contract law’s relational justice floor. Some rules resulted from
adjudication, others were enacted by legislatures and regulators. Often, common
law judges first set a vague standard, then legislators and regulators pinned down
the rules with more specificity. We cannot fully explore this complex inventory
here,44 and offer instead a brief overview of how contract doctrine has implemented
the relational justice floor.

B. The Floor in Contract Law
1. Mandatory Rules. The traditional laissez faire mode of regulating the
parties’ bargaining process prohibited only the active interference of one party with
the other’s free will. Today, many mandatory contract rules go well beyond this
floor, requiring affirmative interpersonal obligations that expand the range of
invalidating factors for contracts. Concern for relational justice is the most
persuasive justification for these rules.
For example, the law of fraud has expanded beyond the traditional
categories of misrepresentation and concealment to include disclosure duties—

See
Hanoch
Dagan
&
Avihay
Dorfman,
Justice
for
Contracts,
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3435781; Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 9, at 1438–45;
Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Poverty and Private Law: Beyond Distributive Justice,
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637034, on which the following section heavily relies.
44
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notably in real estate and securities transactions. The same conceptual expansion
also underlies doctrines as diverse as unilateral mistake, duress in cases of
wrongful threats that do not violate others’ rights, anti‐price‐gouging laws, and
admiralty rules of salvage. Finally, concern for relational justice offers the most
charitable explanation of unconscionability doctrine and some of its modern
regulatory cognates, which explicitly target cases of “gross inequality of bargaining
power,” such as where the weaker party suffers from “physical or mental
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the
agreement.”45
2. Rules Concerning Interpersonal Decency. A parallel set of diverse rules that
also vindicate contract’s relational justice floor have not been conventionally
understood as within the canon of contract law. Nevertheless, these rules are
increasingly part of the actual life of contract.
Consider, for example, rules regarding minimum wages, safety in the
workplace, or the habitability of homes. All these doctrines can be understood as
mandating the minimal level of interpersonal decency law is willing to accept in
contract types that significantly affect the person or ground projects of a contracting
party. This group of mandatory contract rules are, by now, well entrenched. Yet
their foundations are hotly debated as a matter of contract theory. Again, concern
for relational justice offers the most plausible answer.
3. Rules Concerning Constitutive Features. Another set of perhaps puzzling
rules concerns duties to respect contractual parties as the people they actually are,
and therefore to accommodate constitutive features such as race, gender, language,
nationality, religion, disability, familial status, and sexual orientation. At times,
these duties may be relevant to the content of the parties’ obligations.
More often, however, these duties serve as “gatekeepers” to ensure that
parties who make systemic use of contract—by becoming employers, landlords, or
owners of public accommodations—do not apply discriminatory practices in their

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981). See also, e.g., Dodd‐Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1031(d), Pub L. No. 111‐203, 124 Stat. 1376,
12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2010).

45
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choice of contractual counterparts and, by doing so, contravene the requirement of
reciprocal respect for self‐determination on which contract is founded.
4. Intertemporal Relational Justice. Finally, because contractual performance
is typically sequential, contract generates the potential of opportunistic behavior
and, therefore, of heightened interpersonal vulnerability. This contract‐specific
type of relational injustice implies that law must go beyond the mandatory floor of
relational justice. If contract law is to facilitate contracts proactively, it must solidify
a cooperative conception of contract performance.
A liberal conception of contract should not force contractual parties to
attend to each other’s vulnerability more than they attend to the vulnerability of,
say, strangers. But opportunism is anathema to contract’s ability to perform its
autonomy‐enhancing function, particularly the ability to plan across time. So, a
liberal contract law cannot be indifferent to opportunism, either.
And indeed, modern contract law embraces a set of rules that prescribe
moderate cooperative duties as normative defaults. The duty of good faith and fair
dealing, which sets up the contractual rules of the game, stands at the core of this
web of doctrines. The substantial performance doctrine in service contracts and the
principle against forfeiture in applying the condition/promise distinction, as well
as the burden to mitigate and the choice of the expectation interest as the default
measure of recovery can likewise be interpreted as belonging to this cooperative
framework.
All these doctrines commit contractual parties to assist each other up to a
point. Here, relational justice is functioning not as a floor, that is, as a prerequisite
to law’s legitimate use. Instead, relational justice works as an aspirational idea, one
that informs contract law’s normative defaults. Therefore, parties may generally
opt out from many of these rules; likewise, many specific obligations that are
understood to derive from the general duty of good faith are not mandatory.

VI. BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND WELFARE
We conclude this short chapter with a reflection on the continuity and
(especially) the divergence between choice theory and the economic analysis of
contracts. Much debate on choice theory has placed this question at its center.
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A. Continuity
Consider first continuity. Like economic analysis, choice theory is
unapologetically teleological—both are unlike familiar liberal theories of contract
that fiercely resist teleological analysis.
The guiding principles discussed above are all aimed at enhancing
individual autonomy through contract law. Thus, choice theory instructs the
architects of contract law to take an ex ante perspective and to shape changes to
contract doctrines by carefully examining their likely effects. Because this endeavor
requires careful attention to the incentive effects of legal rules, lawmakers
concerned with implementing choice theory can, and indeed should, often rely on
economic analysis of contracts and the insights it offers.
That said, the task of designing contract law to comply with choice theory
is quite different from shaping law to maximize social welfare. Welfare‐
foundationalist accounts treat contract law as a technology for better allocating
resources and entitlements so as to maximize overall welfare. These accounts
endorse contracts (and markets) because of their epistemic work in revealing
preferences. And they focus on the contractual parties because they assume joint
maximization of the parties’ preferences will usually converge with social welfare
maximization—except in cases of significant externalities.
We appreciate aspects of these accounts—the epistemic role of freedom of
contract and the hoped‐for convergence of “local welfarist” accounting with full‐
blown social welfare. But that is not enough.

B. Divergences
1. Autonomy v. Collectivism. Our disagreement begins with our resistance to
the inescapable collectivist logic of contract’s economic analyses. In our view, any
adequate account of contract, as it actually exists, must take seriously its nature as
an interpersonal interaction, rather than a tool in service of the greater good. More
fundamentally, we disagree on contract’s ultimate value. It must be autonomy—
each individual’s freedom for self‐authorship—not social welfare.
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2. Private Ordering. Contract is law’s main means of private ordering—that
is, it empowers every single individual to carry out his or her own plans. It is not
merely a tool for the public good. This is why contract law vests standing to sue for
breach in the parties to the contract, rather than in society as a whole. A promisee’s
grievance is interpersonal. It is not derivative of, or dependent upon, the party’s
possible function as a private attorney general in service of social welfare.
3. Externalities. Likewise, autonomy, not social welfare, explains why only
excessive externalities should be internalized. Although contractual interactions
must not overly subordinate the interests of third parties, they are not, and should
not be, subordinated to the dictates of the general interest. Many economic analysts
of contract elide this distinction by focusing on the micro, rather than macro, effects
of alternative rules. But that is not social welfare analysis. In our view, the elision
reflects an indirect attempt to show concern for individuals; choice theory does this
directly.
4. Distributive v. Relational Justice. Welfare economics, to be sure, does not
only look at the size of the pie; it also allows for distributive considerations. But
that is not enough. Distribution is still a collectivist concern. Liberal contract law
focuses on relational justice, rather than distributive justice. As a branch of private
law, contract focuses on the parties’ individual capacities and their interpersonal
interactions, rather than on the social order as a whole.
Distributive justice is important—even if attempts to promote it through
contract are likely futile or counter‐productive.46 And its demands may at times
supersede those of relational justice. But our agreement on this point does not
diminish the freestanding significance of relational justice. Contract law is where
we constitute our interpersonal relationships, say, as workers or consumers; private
law is the arena in which we vindicate our claims for relational justice. Only the
most urgent distributive concerns may legitimately override the demands of
relational justice within private law. By contrast, distributive justice can (and

See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer‐
Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 376 –77 (1991).

46
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usually should) be addressed elsewhere, say through taxes, subsidies, and other
public schemes for redistribution.47
5. Preferences and Self‐Determination. Finally, and most fundamentally,
welfare‐foundationalism must be rejected as the lodestar of contract law because it
reverses the proper relationship between people’s autonomy and their preferences.
Autonomy is not important because people happen to have a preference for self‐
determination. It’s the other way around.48
Satisfying people’s preferences is important because of the role preferences
play in people’s life plans; similarly, promoting social welfare matters because it
can serve an individual’s self‐determination. People are not data points of
preferences or joint carriers of the aggregate social welfare. They are agents with
projects who are entitled to govern their lives.49 And contract, as we’ve argued,
plays an irreducible role in promoting their self‐determination.
It is thus unsurprising that welfare foundationalism cannot fully justify
contract. If people’s contractual choices are valuable only for their epistemic service
in maximizing social welfare, then we could envision replacing contract with a
more efficient way of deducing people’s preferences. This may sound futuristic, but
perhaps it is not. In a few decades, when global computing capacity surpasses that
of human cognition, computers will be able to learn, we are told, “the statistical
patterns in human behavior [and] use this information to distribute goods (and
jobs) as well as, or possibly better than, people can choose goods (and jobs)
themselves.”50
Contract, however, is not so easily replaceable. Even if its epistemic career
ends—even if it becomes welfare‐reducing—contract’s fundamental role as an

See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 11; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Interpersonal
Human Rights, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361 (2018).
47

Cf. Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, Economic Analysis in Law, YALE J. REG. (forthcoming
2021).
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See Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and The Just Society, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 1289 (2019).
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ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
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irreducible tool for empowering people’s self‐determination will not disappear, or
at least, it should not.

C. The Price of Freedom
Even before we get to this juncture, there are valuable consequences from
insisting that autonomy, not welfare, is contract’s ultimate value. For example,
return for a moment to the maxim of intra‐sphere multiplicity for contract types.
Economic analysts will note that they too do not always recommend following
majoritarian preferences. They instruct lawmakers to look sometimes for
minoritarian terms as penalty defaults that have an efficient information‐forcing
function. Choice theory, however, prescribes minoritarian and utopian types (not
terms) for a different purpose: enriching the range of people’s choices.
Choice theory’s future‐self limit and relational‐justice floor likewise suggest
different doctrinal paths depending on whether contract ultimately serves
autonomy or welfare—and even if welfare is defined locally, as maximizing just
the preference satisfaction of the contracting parties. These divergences should not
be surprising. For contract law to serve its autonomy‐enhancing telos, it must
distinguish between our brute preferences and the features that make us who we
are—our immutable characteristics and the choices that define our most important
projects.
Welfarism aims contract law toward collective well‐being. Choice theory
directs it to enhance individual autonomy. Often, the approaches dovetail: the
efficient rule also enhances autonomy. But not always. Then law must make a
choice; and liberal contract law must choose individual autonomy first.
Contract’s ultimate value must be autonomy, properly understood and
refined. It cannot be welfare. Indeed, we go further: for contract law, welfare
economics is indefensible without autonomy as its foundation. Freedom is not free.
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